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SUPPORT CLAIMS OF THE WIFE AND THE SPENDTHRIFT
TRUST INTEREST OF THE HUSBAND-BENEFICIARY
By
John L. Bigelow
In the recent case of Lippincott v. Lippincott,' the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, through Mr. Justice Drew, said:
"It is now firmly settled not only by our decisions, but also under our
Statutes, that as to claims for maintenance and support of deserted and
neglected wive, not divorced, spendthrift trusts are invalid in this
Commonwealth."
This unequivocal excerpt hints that such was not always the law. Factually,
case law around the 1900's proves it. In Thackera v. Mintzer2 a testamentary
spendthrift trust, in which the husband was the beneficiary, was attacked by the
wife who had secured a divorce a mensa et thoro, a bed and board divorce, as dis-
tinguished from an absolute divorce. She had been awarded monthly support. The
1349 Pa. 501, at page 504 (1944).
2100 Pa. 151, (1882).
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payments having fallen in arrears, she issued a writ of attachment against the in-
come due the beneficiary-husband under the spendthrift trust. The trust success-
fully withstood the assault. The court baldly stated that the testator's intent was
the decisive factor. It reasoned that the testator-settlor had impressed on the fund
exemption from all kinds of legal process against the trustee, and added:
"If we depart from the clearly expressed will of the testator in this re-
spect, we make a new will, instead of enforcing the one he made."
Likewise in the later case of Board of Charities v. Lockard,3 the husband-bene-
ficiary of a testamentary spendthrift trust created by his father, neglected to support
his wife. She secured a support order and the Court of Quarter Sessions ordered
the trustee to pay a weekly sum to her from the income of the trust due to the
husband-beneficiary. The Supreme Court, on appeal, held that the income thereof
could not be attached. Reaffirming its policy of giving full consideration to the
testator-settlor's intent, the Court said:
"The fund did not originate with the beneficiary, but the bequest was
made by anoth'er, the father, who had a right to bestow his benefactions
as he pleased, and in this case, he chose to bestow them upon the son, and
upon him alone. We agree entirely with all that has been said about the
duty of the b-eneficiary to support his wife and child, but that does not
authorize interference with the right of another individual to dispose
of his own property as he may see fit."
The rule asserted in these two early cases is in direct opposition to the stand
taken by the Court in the recent Lippincott case. This change of position from
one extreme to the other has been accomplished, as Justice Drew pointed out, by
statute and by case law itself. Tracing the change, and the extent thereof, is in-
teresting because behind the obvious about-face in the law there is involved a
silent shifting of emphasis from one fundamental policy to another. Law is, after
all, the ultimate crystallization of public policies which endeavor to promote the
orderly conduct of society. Occasionally these policies meet in head-on collision.
The story of the extreme change in reference to spendthrift trusts and the wife's
claim for support is that of a conflict of two fundamental policies nd the ultimate
resolution of that clash.
Upholding the spendthrift provisions in a trust is upholding the basic policy
that a donor has a right to dispose of his property as he so desires. Weaving its
way through the common law is the doctrine, based upon public sentiment, that a
man can give his property to whom and under such conditions as he wishes. In
disposing of his property via a spendthrift trust, the donor conditions the transfer
to the extent that " ... by the terms of the trust a valid restraint is placed on the
voluntary and involuntary transfer of the interest of the beneficiary ..- 4 That
3198 Pa. 572, (1901).
4
Restatement of Trusts, Section 152.
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is to say, such a trust is one so limited by its terms that the beneficiary's interest can-
not be transferred or assigned by him, nor is it subject to the claims of his creditors
prior to actual payment to him. In the words of the Supreme Court:5
"A spendthrift trust . . . exists where there is an express provision for-
bidding anticipatory alienations, and attachment by creditors."
Naturally, spurred by such advantages, spendthrift provisions in inter vivos and
testamentary trusts have increased in number, particularly in Pennsylvania where
the doctrine of the spendthrift trust is said to have originated.6 As a result, the
Pennsylvania courts have been zealous in upholding the validity of such provisions. 7
Only one exception has been grafted upon it, to wit, that a person cannot create
a spendtdirift trust for himself as beneficiary. 8 To countenance such a procedure
would enable one to defeat his creditors too easily.
However, sustaining spendthrift trusts where the beneficiary is a third
person rather than the creator himself still runs against the general policy of the
law that a creditor has a sacred right to secure satisfaction from his debtor's (bene-
ficiary's) property. The interest of a beneficiary in a trust is considered a property
interest.
Nevertheless, Pennsylvania courts have continually given these trusts their
blessing, as a mother blesses her own child, leaving the policy protecting creditors
a poor runner-up. 9
When, however, the claim against the interest of a beneficiary is that of a
deserted or neglected wife or children for support, another public policy enters
the arena to do battle against the policy behind spendthrift trusts. This policy
is stronger than, and incidentally absorbs, the principle which supports creditors'
claims. In assuming the status of man and wife, the state as an interested third
party imposes a legal duty upon the husband,
"to provide for and protect his wife during the life of their marriage.
The Commonwealth has a vital interest in the maintenance of marriage,
because it is the foundation of society . . . the Commonwealth is vitally
interested not only in the moral and social factors, but also in preventing
wives from becoming public charges."' 1
The policy that a husband is under duty to support his wife and children had
5 Keeler's Estate, 334 Pa. 225, at page 229, (1939).
GFisher v. Taylor, 2 Rawle 33 (1829) dictum. Holdship v. Patterson, 7 Watts 547 (1838).
?Shankland's Appeal, 47 Pa. 113, (1864). Rife v. Geyer, 59 Pa. 393, (1868). Estate of
Moses Stambaugh, 135 Pa. 585, (1890).
8Mackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. 330, (1862).
9Board of Charities v. Lockard, 198 Pa. 572, (1901); Stewart's Estate, 334 Pa. 356, (1939);
Lippincott v. Lippincott, 349 Pa. 501, (1944).
iOSupra, note 1.
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been crystallized as early as 1867 in the Support Act of that year. 1 But case law,
the Thackeral2 and Lockard' 3 cases, had excepted spendthrift trusts from attach-
ment on support orders. It was necessary for the Legislature to overcome the
effect of these decisions and to shift the emphasis on policies. In 1917, remem-
bered in Pennsylvania legislative history because of the volume and importance
of legislation enacted therein, the General Assembly turned its attention to spend-
thrift trusts. In that year and in 1921, a relatively short space of time, two stat-
utes were passed which remain in full force and effect today. As outstanding pro-
nouncements of legislative policy concerning spendthrift trusts and the wife's
claims for support, the provisions of each Act are worth quoting in toto.
The Wills Act of 1917,14 reads as follows:
"All income whatsoever, devised or bequeathed by any will so as to be
free from liability for the debts, contracts, or engagements of the bene-
ficiary, or so as not to be subject to execution, attachment sur judgment,
sequestration, or other process, shall, notwithstanding such testamen-
tary provisions, be subject to and liable for the support and maintenance
of the wife and minor child of the beneficiary, and for the value of
necessaries furnished to them, or any of them, where said beneficiary
has refused or neglected to provide suitably for them; and all of the in-
come of said beneficiary shall be subject to all legal process issued by
any Court of this Commonwealth having jurisdiction in the premises,
in order to enforce such liability of said beneficiary."
This provision referred to spendthrift trusts without mentioning them by
name. The Act applied only to spendthrift trusts created by will, i.e. testamentary
spendthrift trusts. Nothing was said about such trusts which were created or
came into existence before the date of the Act. In general, all of the income from
a testamentary spendthrift trust in the hands of the trustee at the time of the
attachment execution, which ultimately would be distributed to the husband-bene-
ficiary as income, was made subject to claims of wife and children for mainten-
ance and support, i.e. no limitation was placed upon the amount of recovery.
However, an attachment execution was not given the status of a continuing lien
and levy so as to effect income coming into the trustee's hands after the attach-
ment writ was served upon the trustee.
"Support Act of April 13, 1867, P.L. 78; Amendments: Act of March 5, 1907, P.L. 6; Act
of April 15, 1913, P.L. 72; Act of June 15, 1917, P.L. 614. These Statutes remained in force until
the Penal Code of 1939 was enacted (Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872), which repealed the Act of
1867 and its subsequent amending Acts. However, the Code in Sec. 733, has provided similar
provisions, in substance the same as those of the Acts it repealed.
12 Supra, note 2.
1'Supra, note 3.
14Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403, Section 19; (20 PS 243).
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Thus having announced its policy with regard to testamentary spendthrift
trusts, the Legislature devoted its attention to inter vivos spendthrift trusts. The
result was embodied in the Act of 1921,1 and reads as follows:
"Sec. 1-Be it enacted that whenever any court of competent jurisdiction
has made an order or entered a decree or judgment against any husband
requiring him to pay any sum or sums for the support of his wife or
children or both, the Court may issue the appropriate writ of execution
against any property, real or personal, belonging to the defendant to
enforce said order, decree, or judgment, and the said court may issue a
writ of attachment execution, or writ in the nature of attachment execu-
tion, against any money or property to which said husband is entitled,
whether under what is known as a spendthrift trust or otherwise; and the
said writ of attachment execution shall become a lien and continuing
levy upon any money or property to which he may be in any way en-
titled, whether under what is commonly known as a spendthrift trust
or otherwise; and, in cases of levy on, or attachment of any trust, said
levy or attachment shall only be, for 50 per centum thereof, and shall
remain a continuing levy until the order, decree, or judgment has been
paid in full, with costs; and, in cases where the order, decree, or judg-
ment requires the payment of stated sums at stated intervals, said writ
of attachment 'excution shall remain a lien and continuing levy until
the last payment due under such order, decree, or judgment has been
made, with costs . . . The provisions of this act shall apply to any Trust
whether it is such a trust as is known as a spendthrift trust or otherwise,
whether such trust was created or came into existence before or after the
passage of this act. Where an attachment execution is issued, the fur-
ther proceedings thereon shall be in the manner heretofore practiced, and
allowed in cases of foreign attachment."
Note that the Act, by employing the general term "spendthrift trust" without
words of limitation, thus applies to both inter vivos and testamentary trusts,
whereas the Wills Act relates to the latter only. By its terms the Act of 1921
applies to trusts activated before or after the date of the act. The important
feature is that it limits recovery to 50 per centum of the beneficiary's income in
the trustee's hands, but provides in effect for a lien and continuing levy until all
payments under the decree for support are made in full. Thus, as income comes in-
to the trustee's possession, 50 per cent thereof automatically comes under the
attachment. The writ having been served upon the trustee, no further process is
necessary. This lien continues until the support order is satisfied. Though the
order provides for future payments to the wife, the lien is in force as the future
payments become due."6
Thus by the year 1922, the Court's exalted child, the spendthrift trust, had
been attacked with the results that testamentary trusts could be proceeded against
16Act of May 10, 1921, P.L. 434.
16The constitutionality of the Act of 1921 was upheld in Everhart v. Everhart, 87 Pa. Super
184, (1926), as being within the police power of the State.
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by support decrees with recovery allowed up to 100% of the husband-beneficiary's
interest, and inter vivos as well as testamentary trusts were subject to support
claims brought under the Act of 1921, with recovery limited to 50% of the hus-
band-beneficiary's interest, but with provision for continuing lien.
With the Legislature now definitely favoring the policy of a husband's duty
to support, as above, the right of the donor to dispose freely of his property, the
situation remained static until 1927 when the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
the case of Moorehead's Estate,17 recognized for the first time an additional ground
upon which a wife could recover against a spendthrift trust, a common law right,
completely independent of any Statutory right previously given her. That is to
say, the court was by decisional law overruling its earlier position in the Thackerel
and Lockard cases.18
In Moorehead's Estate'9 a testamentary spendthrift trust was activated
around 1908 by the beneficiary's mother, and the beneficiary thereof was the
husband of the plaintiff in the action. He deserted her and she brought an action
to levy upon the income in the hands of the trustee, due the husband from the
trust, for her support and maintenance. Neither the Statute of 1917 nor the
Statute of 1921 were involved in the case. The court ruled in favor of the wife's
claim on two theories. First, the court analyzed the trust instrument which con-
tained express spendthrift provisions, and the surrounding circumstances, arid
concluded that the settlor's intent was not to preclude the husband-beneficiary's in-
terest from support and maintenance claims by his wife. The court admitted the
use of the words "creditors" and "debts" in the instrument, but felt that a wife's
claim for support does not make her a creditor in the ordinary sense of the word,
and the obligations arising under the marriage relation do not fall within the scope
of the nature or meaning of a "debt." It would seem, however, that a claim for
support when due, does create a debtor-creditor relationship between husband and
wife. The reason why the husband owes the money becomes less important than
the fact that he does owe something. He is now a debtor; his wife is now creditor.
Secondly, the court openly declared that even if the spendthrift trust provisions were
construed as to include the wife as a creditor, yet the trust must fall before a sup-
port decree because public policy was involved in the duty of the husband to sup-
port the wife. Said the court:
"In every civilized country is recognized the obligation sacred as well
as lawful, of a husband to protect and provide for his family, and to
sustain the claim of the husband in the case at bar (denying the wife's
claim against the spendthrift trust) would be to invest him with a right
to be both a faithless husband and a vicious citizen. This case reaches
beyond the concern of the immediate parties to it."
17289 Pa. 542, (1927).





Although the case is not as strong as its later brothers because it stressed the crea-
tor's intent as well as public policy, nevertheless, the practical result was to over-
rule, without statutory aid, a spendthrift trust in favor of a wife's support decree.
In 1934 came the case of Thomas v. Thomas, 20 in which the court considered
the claim of a deserted wife against testamentary spendthrift provisions. It was
held again that, independent of the Act of 1921, the husband's property interest
therein could be reached. The court said:
"To the extent that the cases prior to the decision in Moorehead's Es-
tate differ therefrom, the former must be considered as overruled. It is
a step in the right direction and consonant with public policy and good
morals."
Then once again the court stressed the donor's intent, saying it was clear that the
intention of the testator-settlor was that the wife should not be excluded from
benefitting from the trust, since she had a life interest beginning after her hus-
band's life interest expired. This would seem to be an obvious effort to give lip-
service to the donor's intent which is behind a spendthrift trust, while actually over-
riding those very provisions. It is noteworthy, however, that the decision basically
revolved around public policy, the language concerning the creator's intent being
dictum.
The Restatement of Trusts adopted this Pennsylvania common law view in
this language:
"Section 157: Particular Classes of Claimants.
Although a trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest
of the beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of an enforceable claim
against the beneficiary, (a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for
support . . . "
With both a common law right and a statutory right existing side by side, it
remained for the Supreme Court to fit both into a pattern; and its opportunity to do
so came in 1939, in Stewart's Estate.2' This case involved two trusts-one an inter
vivos spendthrift trust, the other an ordinary testamentry trust. The apparent con-
flict arose upon the matter of the percentage of the husband's interest in the spend-
thrift trust which could be attached. The trustee and husband-beneficiary claimed
that the maximum was 50 per cent, as awarded under the provisions of the Act of
1921. The wife, relying upon the Moorehead case, which had announced the
common law doctrine, argued that 100 per cent was attachable. The lower court
awarded her 50 per cent, basing its judgment upon the statute. She appealed, and
the Supreme Court allowed recovery upon 100 per cent of the husband's interest as
beneficiary. Justice Drew said:
20112 Pa. Super 578, (1934).
21334 Pa. 356, (1939).
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"That statute (Act of 1921), as to trusts created by deed, is but an en-
abling one and affords an additional remedy to that which a wife had
prior to its enactment. It is permissivc and cumulative only; and is not
exclusive. Since the passage of that act, a wife has, under similar cir.
cumstances as here under consideration, two remedies; first, she may, as
heretofore, reduce to judgment the accrued payments due her under an
order, judgment, or decree, execute thereon and recover such accured
payments to the extent of 10per cent of her husband's beneficial inter-
est in the trust; or second, proceed under the Act of 1921, where the
order, decree or judgment allowing her support requires 'payments of
stated sums at stated intervals,' and levy and attach but 50 per cent of her
husband's interest, and such writ 'shall remain a lien and continuing
levy until the last payment due under such order . . . has been made,
with costs.' Mrs. Stewart (claimant wife) having proceeded under the
first of these remedies, as an ordinary creditor, she may reach 100 per
cent of the beneficial interest of her husband in the trust, but she can
recover her claim only in so far as it has accrued. However, had she
proceeded under the Act, she could have reached only 50 per cent of
the income of the trust but her entire claim, whether accrued or not, would
have become a continuing lien against the trust until it had been fully
satisfied."
It would appear then, that today modern Pennsylvania case law allows 100 per
cent recovery against an inter vivos or testamentary spendthrift trust, and the Wills
Act of 1917 allows 100 per cent recovery against testamentary spendthrift trusts
only. If, however, the wife brings action under the 1921 Statute, recovery is
allowed to only 50 per cent of the husband-beneficiary's interest under either type
of spendthrift trust, but her total claim, present and future, becomes a continuing
lien against the trust interest until it has been completely paid.
There was also a second trust involved in Stewart's Estate, supra. It was a testa-
mentary trust containing no spendthrift provisions. Thus the entire income was
attachable by the wife to secure payment of her decree, subject to any prior legal
claims, for the same reasons that the entire income from an ordinary inter vivos
trust can be reached by creditors of the beneficiary. Then the court, by dicta, placed
the statutes of 1917 and 1921 together with regard to testamentary spendthrift
trusts in these words:
"Even where a testamentary trust contains a spendthrift clause, the
entire income therefrom is made liable for the maintenance of the bene-
ficiary's wife, by section 19 of the Wills Act of 1917, P.L. 403. The
right to reach the entire income from a testamentary trust, whether
spendthrift or otherwise ... is not affected by the Act of 1921, P. L. 434.
As we have already indicated, that Act merely gives the wife an addi-
tional remedy where she seeks to make future payments a lien on the
trust. It did not, therefore, affect the existing right to reach the entire
income from an ordinary testamentary trust, nor did it either expressly
or by implication repeal section 19 of the Wills Act, giving that right
where the testamentary trust was a spendthrift one."
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The main feature of the shift in emphasis from one policy to another having
been well established, collateral issues on the horizon were subsequently settled.
One which was presented to the Court was whether the Acts and the decisional law
applied to non-resident as well as resident wives, holding foreign, i. e. other states'
decrees, orders, or judgments. In Everhart v. Everhart,2 the Court held that the
statute did not authorize the issuance of attachment on a foreign execution. Like-
wise in Naylor's Estate,23 the lower court ruled that the Act of 1921 applied only
where the wife and minor children were "citizens" of the State of Pennsylvania,
who otherwise might become public charges.
In 1939, however, in Stewart's Estate,24 the Supreme Court overruled both
Superior and lower court cases. There the father-settlor set up an inter vivos spend-
thrift trust for his son, who married and later separated from his wife. She was a
resident of Florida and secured a Florida support order. Unpaid claims mounted,
and from time to time she secured five Florida judgments for the accured unpaid
sums. In Pennsylvania she had five foreign attachments issued against her hus-
band-beneficiary and summoned the trustee as garnishee. The total was in excess
of $9,000. The husband claimed she could collect nothing, being a non-resident
attempting to proceed upon a decree of a court of Florida, while the Act of 1921
related only to resident wives holding Pennsylvania decrees. The Court held that
neither the statutes nor case decisions precluded claims of a non-resident wife, nor
the entry of a decree or judgment of a foreign jurisdiction in a court of this state
and the issuance of an appropriate writ of execution by such Pennsylvania court.
The statute of 1921 provides specifically, ". . . that whenever any court of com-
petent jurisdiction has . . . entered a decree or judgment . . . the court may issue
the appropriate writ of execution .. " The Court concluded that the question in-
volved did not concern a suit to secure an order for maintenance and support for
the wife of the beneficiary, but rather the problem involved was an attempt by her to
enforce payment of a decree rendered by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction
to which the Pennsylvania court must give full faith and credit under the Federal
Constitution.
In 1944, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this position, in Lippincott v. Lippin-
cott,25 and held that a non-resident wife could attach her husband's spendthrift
trust interest in Pennsylvania under a California judgment growing out of ac-
cumulated arrearages under an order of support which had been obtained from
a California court.
The latest issue before the court concerned alimony claims of a divorced wife
against the husband-beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust. Previously, all
cases had involved claims for support by a deserted or neglected wife. Issue
2TSupra, note 16.
2319 D & C 417, (1937).
2 4Supra, note 21.2 6Supra, note 1.
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arose in Lippincott v. Lippincott in 1944.26 There Lippincott was the beneficiary
of an inter vivos spendthrift trust created in 1927 by his mother. His first wife
had secured an absolute divorce with an award of alimony by a New York decree
in 1919. He remarried in 1921 and deserted his second wife in 1928. She
obtained a support order in California, where she resided. Both women claimed
the beneficiary's interest in the hands of the trustee. The Court held that the
deserted wife could attach the interest, but ruled against the divorced wife, saying:
"Execution cannot be had against a spendthrift trust in payment of
alimony awarded to a divorced wife."
To reach this conclusion, the Court cited the Wills Act of 1917, the Act of 1921,
and the decisions in Moorehead's Estate and Stewart's Estate, all to the effect that
the use of the word wife in each referred to a woman then married to a man in
lawful wedlock; not to a former wife, an ex-wife, or a divorced wife.
With the termination of the marriage the husband's duty of support, and the
State's interest as a third party, ceases. Thus the reason for denying a spendthrift
trust ascendency in such a situation ceases when public policy no longer exists. To
quote tht Court:
"After such complete and final separation it is not considered that any
public policy requires the allowance of such an extraordinary and drastic
remedy as seizure by execution against the desire and intent of the
creator of that trust."
Therefore the Court treated the New York judgment for permanent alimony to the
divorced wife as a judgment for an ordinary debt, and open only to the usual
remedies given in Pennsylvania to judgments of ordinary creditors.
Pennsylvania appellate courts have not had occasion to pass upon the claim
of deserted or neglected children for support against a father's spendthrift trust in-
terest. It is submitted that the Statutes of 1917 and 1921 specifically, and case law
since, by implication, give the minor children the same right as the wife has. Further-
more, the bare fact that a divorce may nullify the wife's right, will not affect the
minor children's right to continue to secure satisfaction for their support orders
after the divorce, since the father's duty to support minor children ordinarily
survives divorce.
It is interesting to note in many of the cases since 1921, that while denting
the armor of the spendthrift trust in favor of the deserted wife, the Court has con-
tinued to attempt to remain loyal to the idea of a spendthrift trust and the policy
of giving a donor the right to condition his gift, by clutching at straws to find ill
each spendthrift trust no intent on the donor's part to exclude such wife's claims
but merely an intent to exclude the claims of all other creditors.
26349 Pa. 501, (1944).
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In Moorehead's Estate2 7 the Court found that, upon analysis of the trust
instrument, the donor-testator's intent was not to preclude the husband-beneficiary's
interest from support claims of his wife.
In Stewart's Estate 28 the Court by dicta mentioned again the donor's intent
as not having been contra claims by the wife against the husband-beneficiary's in.
terest. In a negative statement it said that nowhere in the trust instrument could
be found any proof that the settlor intended to exclude support claims by the wife.
However, the Court concluded that even if affirmatively expressed, public policy
had now shifted against recognizing such an express intent.
In Lippincott v. Lippincott29 the Court again saluted the donor-settlor's in-
tent, attempting to imply from the absence of express language to the contrary in
the trust instrument an intent on the part of the mother-settlor to free the son's in-
terest from his divorced wife's claims for alimony, but not to bar any claim his
second deserted wife might make. Whether such intent actually existed in the
donor's mind is questionabl'c. Anyway, this is a situation in which it is more
advisable to look at what the courts do, rather than the language of their opinions.
The conclusion is inevitable that regardless of the increasing use of spend-
thrift provisions in trusts, they are of no avail against the claims for support and
maintenance by a deserted or neglected wife and children. For this purpose such
a trust, inter vivos or testamentary, will be treated as an ordinary trust so far as
the wife and children of the beneficiary are concerned. They can proceed against
it with full confidence.
2 7
Supra, note 17.
28Supra, note 21.
29Supra, note 26.
